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HOUSING BUBBLE AND ECONOMIC THEORY: IS MAINSTREAM 





The current crisis in the global economy is considered on a par with the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. We can therefore ask whether the crisis will lead economists to revise the 
mainstream theory. The first result presented in this paper is to show that the traditional 
theory does not permit the formulation of a coherent explanation of the causes of the crisis 
because it uses concepts that are not coherent with the dominant theory of finance.  The 
second result is to show that these concepts are coherent with a theory of finance that can 





The financial crisis that erupted in the summer of 2007 with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market gave rise to a severe economic crisis. Because of its scale, the current 
crisis in the global economy is considered on a par with the two exceptional economic 
phenomena of the twentieth century: the Great Depression of the 1930s and the stagflation 
of the 1970s. 
Both of these events caused economists to radically alter the theoretical model they 
used to interpret the working of the economic system. The Great Depression undermined 
confidence in the classical theory that considered the crises as accidental phenomena that 
would be spontaneously resolved by the normal working of market mechanisms. In 1936, 
in the General Theory,  Keynes presented a new theory that instead postulated that crises 
are structural phenomena and that public sector intervention could prevent and attenuate 
the effects of such crises.   
The stagflation  of the 1970s  led economists to question the capacity of  keynesian 
policies  to  ensure    high  growth  rates  associated  with  low,  or  at  least  stable,  rates  of 
inflation. Milton Friedman wrote a strong critique that showed that keynesian policies were 
effective only in certain conditions that did not seem to be present in those years. This 
critique constituted the theoretical basis for the monetarist counter-revolution, whose basic 
tenet was that the excessive presence of the state in the economy, considered a nefarious 
consequence  of  keynesianism,  was  the  underlying  cause  of  the  stagnation  that 
characterised the global economy. To overcome the crisis it was necessary to allow the 
markets to function fully by reducing the presence of the state; this approach was put into   2 
practice,  starting  in  the  1980s,  through  the  policies  of  privatisation  and  liberalisation 
carried out by Reagan and Thatcher, and has been accepted over the past forty years by the 
majority of economists.  
We can therefore ask whether the current crisis will, as was the case with the two 
historic crises, lead economists to revise the prevailing theoretical model. Of course, the 
economists  who  are  most  closely  associated  with  this  model  hold  that  no  theoretical 
counter revolution is necessary; they believe that the mainstream theory constitutes a solid 
base on which to elaborate a satisfactory explanation of the causes and the characteristics 
of the crisis.
1 In this paper the opposite thesis is put forward, namely that the crisis should 
make economists alter their theoretical model substantially. 
The first result presented in this paper  is to show that the traditional theory does not 
permit the formulation of a coherent  explanation of the causes of the crisis. It will be 
shown that the explanation of the origin of the crisis elaborated by mainstream economists 
uses concepts that are not coherent with the dominant theory of finance; in other words, it 
will be postulated that the explanation of the crisis elaborated by mainstream economists 
contains concepts that bring to the fore the limits of the theory of finance that they accept.  
The  second  result  presented is  to  show that the concepts  on  which  the mainstream 
explanation  of the crisis  is based are coherent with  a theory of finance that can be 
elaborated on the basis of  what we  can  learn from such economists, considered  to be 
heterodox, as Schumpeter, Keynes and Minsky.  
The paper is divided into three parts. The first part contains a brief description of the 
most important aspects of the crisis. The second part deals with the mainstream theory; the 
main  elements  of  this  theory  of  finance  are  recalled ,  after  which  the  mainstream 
explanation of the origin of the crisis is analysed and it is shown that it is not coherent with 
the traditional  theory of finance. In the third part a theory of finance is p resented that 
allows  us  to  give  a  theoretical  founda tion  to  some  concepts  that  characterise  the 
mainstream explanation of the origin of the crisis and to elaborate a coherent explanation 
of the phenomenon of the financial crises.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Taylor, for example,  maintains: “The recent crisis gives no reason to abandon the core empirical „rational 
expectations/sticky price model‟ developed over the past 30 years – whether you call this type of model 
„dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, „new Keynesian‟ or „new neoclassical‟” (Taylor 2010, p. 5). See 
also:  Cochrane 2011.   3 
1. A brief description of the crisis 
 
The principal characteristics of the crisis in the global economy caused by the bursting of 
the housing bubble can be summarised as follows:
2 i) the financial crisis erupted in the 
United States, that is within the most developed financial system in the world ,  and it 
affected the entire global economy; ii) the financial crisis was triggered by insolvencies 
within a component of the mortgage market ,  the  subprime  mortgage  market;  iii)  the 
collapse  of  the  subprime  mortgage  market,  although  it  constituted  a  relatively  modest 
component of the financial system, had devastating effects on the financial system. Many 
banks  failed,  with  the  most  impressive  being  the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman  Brothers  in 
September 2008, and many financial institutions were saved due to the intervention of the 
governments of various countries; iv) the paralysis of the international financial system 
caused the worst global recession since the end of the Second World War. 
This list raises a series of questions: i) what caused the most sophisticated financial 
system in the world to expand the supply of mortgages, and in particular the supply of 
subprime mortgages, to such an extent;
3 ii)  why did individuals with low or no incomes 
apply  for  mortgages  that  entailed  repayment  commitments  which  were  clearly 
incompatible with their financial situations; iii) how was it possible that the collapse of a 
modest component of the financial system such as the  subprime mortgage market risked 
endangering the solidity of the whole financial system; iv) finally, through what channels 
did the crisis in the financial system spread to the real economy, causing a global fall in 
incomes and employment. 
To answer these questions it is necessary to have a theoretical model that specifies the 
role of finance and that defines the relation, if any, between finance and the real economy. 
In the next section the most important aspects of the mainstream theory of finance and the 




                                                 
2 Many studies that describe various aspects of the crisis have been published; see for example: Morris 2008, 
Cooper 2008,  Shiller 2008, Posner 2009,  Fox 2009, Cassidy 2009,  Acharya and Richardson (eds.) 2009, 
Stiglitz 2010, Roubini and Mihm 2010, Rajan 2010.    
3 Acharya, Philippon, Richardson and Roubini  2009 report that between 2004 and 2007 in the United States 
the proportion of subprime mortgages of the total of mortgages granted annually was an average of 43.8 %  
compared to 27.8 % for the previous eleven years.   4 
2. The mainstream explanation of the crisis 
 
2.1 The mainstream theory of finance 
In  this  section  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  traditional  theory  of  finance  are 
summarised. 
a)  The  finance  phenomenon.  The  mainstream  theory  defines  the  phenomenon  of 
finance  starting  from  saving  decisions  and  investment  decisions  and  it  underlines  that 
finance becomes relevant in a world in which the agents that save do not coincide with the 
agents who invest, that is in a world characterised by the dissociation between investment 
decisions  and  saving  decisions.  The  key  function  of  the  financial  system  is  to  make 
possible the transfer of the  resources saved  by savers to agents who invest which we can 
identify with the firms. The saved resources are transferred by the savers to firms by means 
of a credit contract; the mainstream theory defines a causal sequence according to which 
saving decisions determine the supply of credit and therefore investment decisions. The 
rate of interest is the variable that puts in equilibrium demand for and supply of credit and 
therefore saving decisions and investment decisions.
4   
b) The relation between money and credit. The mainstream theory  separates money 
and credit, that is it clearly separates the money creation process from the credit creation 
process. Money is created by the monetary authorities while the credit supply corresponds 
to saving decisions and is therefore independent of the money supply. This aspect of the 
mainstream theory is well illustrated by Friedman and Schwartz (1980) when they respond 
to the criticism levelled at the supporters of the quantity theory of money, of not having 
specified the transmission mechanism that links the variations in the quantity of money to 
the rate of inflation. They consider this criticism unfounded and state that in order to define 
this mechanism it is sufficient to recognise that the money market works in the same way 
                                                 
4 We can find these concepts in every finance handbook: “On the horizontal axis, we measure the quantity of 
funds, and on vertical axis, we measure the real rate of  interest. The supply curve slopes up from left to right 
because the higher the real interest rate, the greater the supply of household savings. The assumption is that at 
higher real interest rates households will choose to postpone some current consumption and set aside or 
invest more of their disposable income to future use. The demand curve slopes down from left to right 
because the lower the real interest rate, the more business want to invest in physical capital. Assuming that 
businesses rank projects by the expected real return on invested capital, firms will  undertake more projects 
the lower the real interest rate on the funds needed to finance those projects. Equilibrium is at the point of 
intersection of the supply and demand curves…”(Bodie, Kane, Markus, 2009, pp. 115-6) 
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as any other market; also in the money market the imbalances between supply and demand 
are eliminated through price variation.  
Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1980,  p.  26)  accuse  the  critics  of  the  quantity  theory  of 
money of confusing the price of money with the price of credit. The price of credit is the 
rate of interest while the price of money corresponds to the quantity of goods that must be 
given up to acquire a unit of money, that is the inverse of the price level; this definition is 
perfectly coherent with the specification of the basic function of money that, according to 
the quantity theory of money, is its being a means of exchange. An increase in the supply 
of money will trigger a fall in the price of money and therefore an increase in price levels. 
This can be explained by recalling that the quantitative theory  holds that a rise in the 
supply of money determines a rise in the aggregate demand. On the contrary, an increase in 
the supply of credit will not have any effect on the aggregate demand since this originates 
with  the  decision  of  the  operators  to  save  more,  that  is  by  the  decision  to  give  up 
consuming goods; this decision is perfectly counter balanced by the increase in the demand 
for investment goods caused by the fall in the rate of interest.   
c) The theory of the financial intermediaries. According to the mainstream theory the 
phenomenon of finance is based on the dissociation of saving decisions and investment 
decisions; this implies that a theory of financial intermediaries should explain the reasons 
why  savers  do  not  transfer  the  saved  resources  directly  to  entrepreneurs,  or,  likewise,  
explain what are the services provided by the financial intermediaries which compensate 
the costs of intermediation (Hellwig 1991, p. 42). The mainstream theory defines these 
services by observing that, in the real world, the markets are not perfect but there are 
obstacles, imperfections that make the direct exchange of the saved resources between 
savers and entrepreneurs difficult. The principal obstacle on which economists‟ attention 
has focused since the 1970s is the presence of asymmetric information. According to the 
mainstream theory the credit market can be compared to the used car market described by 
Akerlof (1970), who emphasised that the presence of asymmetric information stimulates the 
creation of agents whose purpose is to reduce the information costs; he considered, in 
particular, the activity of merchants that specialize in evaluating the quality of the goods 
exchanged.  The banks play the same role in the capital market as the merchants play in 
Akerlof's used car market; as asserted by  Blinder and Stiglitz (1983, p.299):  “Imperfect 
information about the probability of default has several fundamental implications for the   6 
nature of capital markets… it gives rise to institutions – like banks – that specialize in 
acquiring information about default risk.”.
5  
d)  The  relation  between  finance  and  economic  development.  A  financial  system 
characterised  by  the  presence  of  financial  intermediaries  capable  of  eliminating  the 
consequences of asymmetric information facilitates economic growth in two ways. First, 
financial  intermediaries  make  it  possible  to  allocate  the  saved  resources  to  the  most 
productive investments; in this way they ensure that savers get higher interest rates and this 
can  stimulate  saving  and  thus  economic  growth.
6  Second,  the  presence  of  financial 
intermediaries ensures that all the resources saved are invested; in a world with  imperfect 
information it can be very risky for savers who do not have  sufficient information to 
directly finance firms. In this case the most risk-adverse savers could decide to keep their 
savings under the mattress instead of investing them in the credit market, so only a part of 
the saved resources will be translated into investments. The following relation applies (see, 
for example: Pagano 1993; Chou 2007):  
 
1)   λS = I                  0<λ<1 
 
„S‟ represents the flow of savings and „I‟ the flow of investments; the value of λ will be 
lower  the  higher  the  level  of  information  asymmetry  between  savers  and  firms.  The 
presence of intermediaries capable of eliminating the problems of asymmetric information 
will drive the value of λ towards one.   
e) The neutrality of finance. From what we have seen hitherto we can observe that the 
mainstream theory considers finance as a neutral phenomenon, that is one that does not 
influence the structure of the economic system. This conclusion is based on two elements. 
First, the mainstream theory states that it is possible to specify an ideal world characterised 
by perfect information, in which the savers directly finance firms and in which there are no 
intermediaries; in this world the rate of interest is determined, as we have seen, by saving 
decisions  and investment  decisions. The second point involves acknowledging that, by 
specializing in  information  acquisition, the financial intermediaries  make it possible to 
                                                 
5 See, for example: Fama 1985,  Stulz 2001, Watchel  2003, Gorton and Winton 2004 , Capasso 2004, Levine 
2005, Ferguson 2006. 
6  “The  financial  sector  is  important,  because  the  financial  intermediaries  are  responsible  for  resource 
allocation.  Well-working  financial  intermediaries  improve  the  efficiency  of  capital  allocation,  encourage 
savings, and lead to more capital formation. (Wachtel 2003, p. 35) 
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eliminate the obstacles that the presence of imperfect information creates, in the real world, 
to  the  achievement  of  the  results  which  characterize  the  ideal  world  with  perfect 
information. The neutrality of financial intermediaries is due to the fact that their presence 
does not modify the nature of the credit market  with respect to the ideal world without 
imperfections; the key  actors which operate  in this market are the savers and investors, 
and the object of the exchange can either be a real good or money. 
This characteristic of the mainstream theory is well illustrated by Merton and Bodie 
(2005), who propose making a synthesis of the different theoretical approaches elaborated 
in  the  last  few  decades  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of  finance.  The  first  approach  is  
neoclassical finance, which defines the role of finance in a world without imperfections in 
which perfectly rational agents operate. This approach therefore determines the prices and 
the  rates  of  return  that  arise  in  the  various  markets  in  which  the  different  financial 
instruments used to transfer the saved resources from the savers to the firms are traded; 
markets and prices that in the aggregated models are represented by a single market and a 
single interest rate determined by saving decisions and investment decisions. Merton and 
Bodie (2005) note that in recent  years two theoretical approaches have developed that 
criticise the hypotheses on which the neoclassical finance theory is based. The first one, 
defined as new institutional economics, explicitly considers the effects of the presence of 
transaction costs and asymmetric information, while the second one, defined as behavioral 
economics, assumes that the agents take their financial decisions in conditions of limited 
rationality.  The  two  authors  hold  that  these  three  approaches  must  not  be  considered 
alternative,  but  rather  complementary  and  they  propose  a  new  approach,  defined  as 
functional  and  structural  finance,  realised  by  making  a  synthesis  of  the  three.    This 
proposal is justified by the fact that, according to the two authors, the financial institutions, 
whose presence is overlooked in neoclassical finance, make it possible to obtain within 
actual economic systems, the results that characterise the ideal world described by the 
neoclassical finance; the financial institutions can therefore be considered neutral in that 
they do not influence the characteristics of the equilibrium that is realised in  the ideal 
world towards which the actual economies converge.
7  
                                                 
7  “The  two  fundamental  tenets  of  the  functional  and  structural  finance  are:  i)  neoclassical  theory  is 
approximately valid for determining asset prices and resource allocations… but offers little to explain which 
organizational  structures  for  production  and  performing  various  financial  functions  and  which  particular 
market instruments and financial intermediaries will evolve: ii) Neo-institutional and behavioral theories are 
centrally  important  in  analyzing  the  evolution  of  institutions  including  market  instruments  and  financial   8 
An  application  of  the  principle  of  the  neutrality  of  finance  can  be  found  in  the 
mainstream macroeconomic models that completely overlook the credit market and the 
phenomenon of finance; this framework reflects the fact that according to the mainstream 
theory  the  credit  market  coincides  with  the  goods  market.  This  point  has  been  well 
explained by, for example, McCallum (1989) who introduces his Monetary Economics text 
by making explicit the reasons why he looks at the money market, completely leaving 
aside the credit market; he observes that this decision: 
 
 “… rests basically on the fact that in making their borrowing and lending decisions, 
rational  households  (and  firms)  are  fundamentally  concerned  with  goods  and  services 
consumed or provided at various points in time. They are basically concerned, that is, with 
choices involving consumption and labour supply in the present and in the future. But such 
choices must satisfy budget constraints and thus are precisely equivalent to decisions about 
borrowing  and  lending  -  that  is,  supply  and  demand  choices  for  financial  assets.  … 
Consequently, there is no need to consider both types of decisions explicitly.  … it is seriously 
misleading to discuss issues in terms of possible connections between „the financial and real 
sectors of the economy‟, to use a phrase that appears occasionally in the literature on monetary 
policy. The phrase is misleading because it fails to recognise that the financial sector is a real 
sector.” McCallum (1989, pp. 29-30) 
 
f) The nature of the financial crisis. The mainstream theory considers financial crises 
as accidental phenomena, extraneous to the normal working of the economic system. As 
we have seen, pursuant to this theory the fundamental function of financial institutions 
consists  in  annulling  the  effects  of  the  presence  of  imperfections  and  of  the  limited 
rationality  of  agents.  In  this  perspective  the  financial  crises  can  be  considered  as  the 
consequence of the errors or the improper behaviour of some components of the financial 
system. This approach is summarised well by Merton and Bodie: 
 
“As we all know, there have been financial „incidents‟ and even crises, that cause some to 
raise questions about innovations and the scientific soundness of the financial theories used to 
engineer them. There have surely been individual cases of faulty engineering designs and 
faulty implementations of those design in finance just as there have been in building bridges, 
airplanes,  and  silicon  chips.  Indeed  learning  from  (sometimes  even  tragic)  mistakes  is  an 






                                                                                                                                                          
intermediaries,  but  unlikely  to  provide  significant  and  stable  explanations  of  asset  prices  and  resources 
allocations.”  (Merton and Bodie 2005, p.6) 
   9 
2.2 The causes of the crisis under the mainstream theory 
The supporters of the mainstream theory hold that the excessive supply of mortgages and 
in particular of subprime mortgages from the US banking system is due to the presence of 
a  system  of  incentives  that  influenced  the  behaviour  of  banks  by  increasing  their 
propensity for risk.   
This system of incentives is a consequence of the far-reaching transformation in the 
financial  structure  in  the  last  few  decades  owing  to  technological  changes  and 
deregulation.
8 An important element of this transformation is the spread of  the process of 
securitisation  that  transformed  the  banks‟  operative  model  from  originate  and  hold  to 
originate and distribute.  In the past, the banks kept on their balance sheets the mortgages 
granted up to their expiration; they therefore directly bore the risk of a loss due to the 
insolvency of the mortgage holder. For this reason the banks evaluated very carefully the 
characteristics of potential mortgage holders. The spread of the process of  securitisation 
and a system of incentives that linked the bank managers‟ remuneration to the returns 
obtained, severely weakened the propensity to scrupulously assess the characteristics of the 
mortgage holder. The banks had an incentive to expand the supply of mortgages also to 
agents with no capital or with low incomes. The expansion of the mortgage supply was 
facilitated by the distorted behaviour of another important category of financial agent: the 
rating agencies who were supposed to evaluate the characteristics of securities offered on 
the market  and whose judgements were heavily influenced by their connections to the 
agents who issued the securities. 
If the system of incentives and the process of securitisation can explain why the banks 
increased the supply of subprime mortgages, we still have to understand how subjects with 
no capital and with modest incomes could be willing to contract the mortgages that the 
banks offered them. The reasons behind this are generally pinpointed, both by mainstream 
and non mainstream economists, by using the concept of the asset bubble. Shiller (2008), 
for example, observes that the expansion in the supply of mortgages caused a big increase 
in the demand for houses in the real estate market and therefore a big increase in the price 
of houses; he notes that between 1997 and 2006 the price of houses rose 85% in real terms, 
a wholly unique phenomenon considering the entire observation period that starts in 1890, 
and that cannot  be justified  either by the  rise in the population  or the increase in  the 
production costs. He considers this increase in the price of houses as a manifestation of the 
existence of an asset bubble fuelled by the spread of expectations of a continuous increase 
                                                 
8 See for example: Rajan 2006, 2010; Diamond and Rajan 2009. 
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in housing prices. Shiller (2008) points out that these expectations are founded on the 
spreading of „fairy tales‟, that tell the story of the beginning of a new phase in history in 
which housing prices, for example, are destined to rise continuously. Likewise, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) observe that in all the crises there is a widespread shared conviction that 
„this time is different‟.
9 Thus, we can conclude that the willingness of low income agents 
to take out the mortgages that banks offered was justified by the fact that they were also 
convinced that „this time is different‟ and that the prices of housing would continue to rise; 
this would have allowed them to substitute the old mortgage with a new one for a higher 
amount, guaranteed by the higher value of the property.  
Of course, no asset bubble can last indefinitely. In the case of the housing bubble the 
first signs of the crisis were visible in the summer of 2007 when housing prices started to 
fall and there was a significant increase in insolvencies within the mortgage market; this 
triggered a rapid fall in the value of securities that had been issued by agents who had 
bought the mortgages issued by the banks.  
Having explained the origin of the bubble, it is necessary to specify the reasons why 
this crisis, which seemed to involve only a secondary component of the financial markets, 
risked  causing  the  whole  financial  system  to  collapse.  One  widespread  explanation 
highlighted the fact that the subprime mortgages crisis had a big impact on the banks since 
a significant proportion of the mortgage backed securities was not sold on the market but 
stayed within the banking system. This transformed the subprime mortgage crisis into a 
banking crisis. To accept this explanation it is necessary to identify the reasons why the 
banks, which should have realised the poor quality of the subprime mortgages, decided to 
underwrite  securities  whose  returns  depended  on  those  of  the  subprime  mortgages. 
Diamond  and  Rajan  (2009)      and  Rajan    (2010)    maintain  that  this  behaviour  was 
determined by two elements: i) the remuneration system of bank managers that led the  
banks to seek short-term gains by betting on the continuous rise in the price of housing; ii) 
the Federal Reserve‟s pledge, known as the Greenspan  put, not to intervene to  halt the 
                                                 
9 “Financial professionals, and, all too often, government leaders explain that we are doing things better than 
before, we are smarter, and we have learned from past mistakes. Each time, society convinces itself that the 
current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded catastrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound 
fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovation, and good policy.” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, p. 
xxxiv) 
   11 
rise  in  housing  prices  and  to  intervene  only  when  the  bubble  burst  to  limit  the 
consequences.
10  
Moreover, it has been hypothesised that the banks manifested excessive trus t in the 
effects of the financial innovation and  they considered the  complexity  of new financial 
instruments  as  a  significant  indicator  of  their  ability  to  attenuate  the  risk.
11  The 
involvement of the banks can explain the reasons why the financial crisi s  had such a big 
impact on income and employment globally; the heavy losses sustained after the bursting 
of the housing bubble, culminating in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, paralysed the 
banking system and triggered a credit crunch that had serious repercussions for productive  
activity.  
 
2.3 The limits of the mainstream explanation 
Different mainstream economists have  called the crisis a „failure of the market‟. Tabellini, 
for example, states that: 
 
“Without doubt the crisis revealed a serious failure of the most sophisticated markets in 
the world, the modern financial markets. A crucial task of financial markets is the allocation of 
risk. The financial sector failed utterly to do this. The risk was underestimated and many 
intermediaries took on an excessive amount of it.” (Tabellini, 2009)  
 
 
The banks and the rating agencies driven by distorted  incentives  supposedly induced 
the financial system to underestimate the risk and to take on an excessive amount of it. But 
what risk was underestimated? The answer seems obvious if we consider the explanation  
of the origin of the crisis summarised in the previous section: the banks, the rating agencies 
and the other agents of the financial system underestimated the risk of insolvency of the 
holders of subprime mortgages. As the ability of subprime mortgage holders to reimburse 
                                                 
10 “Of course, originators could not completely ignore the true quality of borrowers since they would be 
responsible for initial defaults, but because house prices were rising steadily over this period, even this source 
of discipline weakened: the house price rise would give the homeowner the „equity‟ with which he could 
finance loan repayment.” (Diamond and Rajan 2009, p. 607) 
11 Tabellini observes that the crisis could be considered as a consequence of  an error of evaluation caused by 
the excessive complication of financial instruments: “A not implausible explanation (of the crisis) is that it 
was a mere error of evaluation. The financial innovation was so fast that even sophisticated agents were not 
always  able  to  fully  grasp  the  riskiness  of  the  financial  instruments  that  were  created.  The  systemic 
implications  of  these  instruments  were  even  less  clear.  Consequently,  many  investors  overestimated  the 
capacity of resilience of the global financial markets, overlooking the systemic risk and the risk of illiquidity, 
which instead turned out to be crucial in this crisis. (Tabellini, 2009) 
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the loan essentially depended on the continued rise in housing prices, we  can conclude that 
the banks, the rating agencies and the other financial operators had underestimated the risk 
that the housing bubble could burst.  
This seems to be a reasonable response which makes Tabellini‟s  statement acceptable; 
in actual fact this answer is  not  coherent with  the mainstream theory of  finance, the key 
elements of which were summarised in section 2.1. Indeed, this reply applies in a world in 
which the phenomenon of speculation is prominent  and this presupposes the existence of 
markets  in  which  financial  assets  are  constantly  traded,  while  the  mainstream  theory 
applies  to  a  world  in  which  these  markets  are  not  present  and  the  phenomenon  of 
speculation  does  not exist.  
To illustrate this point, following the approach of Vernon Smith (1988, 2008),  we can 
distinguish two types of market: the first are markets in which producers and purchasers 
trade goods that disappear from the market once they have been purchased; the second are 
markets in which goods that can be sold again at any subsequent  time are traded.  A 
speculative bubble can occur only in an economic system in which the second type of 
market exists where a good can be bought not in relation to the utility its use produces but 
depending on the price at which it can be sold in the future.  
The mainstream finance theory applies to an economic system comprising only the 
first type of markets, indeed, the presence of the second type of markets characterises an 
economic system in which the concept of wealth is important, a concept which is difficult 
to associate with the world  described by the mainstream  theory. In fact, this theory, as we 
have recalled, defines the phenomenon of credit starting with the concepts of saving and 
investment:  saving  decisions  determine  the  credit  supply  and  therefore  the  flow  of 
investments; banks are simply intermediaries who eliminate the effects of the presence of 
obstacles  that  impede  the  direct  transfer  from  savers  to  firms.  These  relations  can  be 
applied to an economic system in which few goods are produced and in which money is a 
mere means of exchange. The  traditional economic theory described the functioning of 
this economic system using models in which it is assumed that a single good is produced; 
this  hypothesis is a common thread in the work of classic economists, neoclassicals right 
up  to  contemporary  supporters  of  the  mainstream  theory.  Smith  (1776),  for  instance, 
describes the effects of saving decisions on the development of the economic system by 
considering a world in which only corn is produced; Böhm Bawerk (1884) instead consider 
a fishermen‟s economy in which only fish are produced. In these economies the saving 
corresponds to the amount of corn or fish produced which is not consumed and which can   13 
therefore be used to produce capital goods that will be used to produce more corn or fish; 
the saving is represented, for example, by the quantity of corn or fish that is used to pay the 
workers involved in producing ploughs or boats.  
It is difficult to associate wealth with this type of economic system; it is unrealistic to 
hypothesise that, for example, a carpenter is willing to accumulate a big quantity of tables 
that permit him to purchase at any future time, an unlimited quantity of food or clothing. 
We can reasonably assume that in this economy there is a limit to the amount of goods that 
an individual wishes to accumulate and, therefore, that the concept of wealth is hardly 
relevant.  
If we exclude the concept of wealth it becomes unrealistic to assume the existence of 
markets in which financial assets are traded on the basis of the expectations about the price 
that they will fetch in the future, and therefore to hypothesise the presence of financial 
crises caused by the underestimation of the risk of insolvency of those who gamble on the 
continuous rise in the price of assets. In the economy described by the mainstream theory 
the only risk is that associated with the presence of asymmetric information; this risk can 
be described by means of the example used by Stiglitz and Weiss (1990) to describe the 
role of banks by considering an agricultural economy, in which the object of the exchange 
is seed to be planted in plots of land having different productivity:  
 
“The  need  for  credit  arises  from  the  discrepancy  between  individual‟s  resource 
endowments and investment opportunities. This can be seen most simply if we imagine a 
primitive agricultural economy, where different individuals own different plots of land and 
have different endowments of seed with which to plant the land. … The marginal return to 
additional  seed  on  different  plots  of  land  may  differ  markedly.  National  output  can  be 
increased enormously if the seed can be reallocated from plots of lands where it has a low 
marginal product to plots where it has a high marginal product. But this requires credit, that is, 
some farmers will have to get more seed than their endowment in return for a promise to repay 
next period, when the crop is harvested. Banks are the  institutions within this society for 
screening the loan applicants, for determining which plots have really high marginal returns, 
and for monitoring, for ensuring that the seed are actually planted, rather than, say, consumed 
by the borrower in a consumption binge ” (Stiglitz and Weiss 1990, pp. 91-92) 
 
It is difficult to hypothesise  that in this economic system a crisis can occur because of 
the underestimation of the  risk by the banks whose decisions are supposedly influenced by 
a system of perverse incentives.  The risk  that banks must face is the  one related to the 
evaluation of the quality of the plots of land and the characteristics of the farmer who 
wishes to use the saved corn. Of course, it  is possible to imagine that there could be a 
banker who is incapable of assessing the quality of the plots of land or to distinguish  a 
good  farmer  from  a swindler, but that is not sufficient to trigger a crisis. A crisis could 
manifest itself only if we  assume that a large part of the bankers-merchants have become    14 
suddenly  incapable of assessing the quality of the terrain or to distinguish a good farmer 
from a swindler. Moreover, if we consider an economy of this type, it is not even possible 
to state that the crisis has been triggered by the innovation process  which supposedly 
induced the agents to believe the „fairy tale‟ of the era which had started thanks to the 
production of new financial instruments capable of reducing the risk. In an economy in 
which the credit market has the characteristics described by the example of Stiglitz and 
Wiess (1990), which are analogous to those of Akerlof‟s used car market, the innovation 
does  not  lead  to  the  underestimation  of  the  risk  but  it  determines  the  creation  of 
instruments that permit mechanics to assess with greater precision the quality of the used 
cars and bankers to better assess the characteristics of agricultural land.  
We  can  conclude  that  the  mainstream  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis allows us to identify the characteristics that a theoretical model should 
have in order to explain the process of the formation of financial crises. In the first place, 
this theoretical model should define the concept of risk in a different way to that which 
could be associated with the credit market described by the  mainstream theory of finance. 
Second,  this  model  should  be  able  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of  speculation  and  the 
presence of what V. Smith (1998, 2008) defines as asset markets. In the last part of this 
paper it will be shown that it is possible to elaborate a theoretical model that possesses 
these characteristics using  what we learn from the theories of Keynes, Schumpeter and 
Minsky.  
 
3. An alternative theory of finance   
 
Many  economists  have  highlighted  the  need  to  recuperate  Keynes‟s  teachings  and  to 
revaluate the work of Minsky.
12 In this paper we set out a theory of finance which takes as 
a  starting point  Keynes‟s  1933 works   in  which he highlights  the need  to  elaborate  a 
monetary theory of production in order to explain the phenomena of the crisis and the 
fluctuations in income and employment, and he notes that the inability of the classical 
theory to explain these phenomena is due to the fact that this theory considers money as a 
                                                 
12 See for example: Akerlof and Shiller 2009, Krugman 2009, 2011,  Skidelsky 2009, 2001, Sachs 2009, 
Colander 2009, 2010,  Crotty 2009, 2011, Kregel 2009, Lawson 2009, Leijhonufvud 2009,  Wray 2009, 
Arestis and Singh 2010, Stiglitz 2010, Laidler 2010, Roubini and Mihm 2010, Goodhart 2010, Roncaglia 
2010, Lucarelli 2011.    15 
neutral variable.
13 Keynes‟s key message is to stress that the presence of money constitutes 
the  necessary  condition  to  explain  the  crises  and  thus  the  two  elements  on  which  the 
explanation of the origin of the crisis elaborated by the mainstream economists is based. 
Following Keynes it is possible: i) to specify the relation between money and the concept 
of uncertainty, which unlike that of risk which characterises mainstream  theory, allows us 
to  elaborate a meaningful explanation of the crisis; ii) specify the relation between money 
and speculation. The next section describes the relation between money and uncertainty, 
while in the following one the relation between money and speculation will be described. 
The last section contains an explanation of the crisis elaborated on the basis of the new 
theory of finance.  
 
3.1 Money and uncertainty 
Keynesian economists such as Skidelsky (2009, 2011), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), and 
Crotty  (2011)  state  that  the  mainstream  theory  is  not  able  to  elaborate  a  meaningful 
explanation of the crisis because it uses the concept of risk and overlooks completely the 
keynesian concept of uncertainty.
14 I believe that this thesis can be reinforced if instead of 
assuming the presence of uncertainty as    an  exogenous element  that characterises the 
keynesian world, we show    that the importance of  the dimension  of uncertainty is a 
consequence of the presence of money, or , in other words, is an expression of the non -
neutrality of money. 
To illustrate the relatio n between money and uncertainty it  is  useful to start  with  
Rajan (2006, 2010), an economis t who can hardly be defined as k eynesian.  On the 
occasion  of  the  2005  Jackson  Hole  Conference  that  was  supposed  to  celebrate  the 
Greenspan era, Rajan presented a pap er that generated a lot of controversy.  Describing 
how the financial sector had evolved during  Greenspan‟s era, Rajan observed that  the 
profound transformation in the financial system in the preceding decades produced great 
benefits but, at the same time, drove the financial system and in particular the banks, to 
create a considerable amount of risk: 
 
                                                 
13 “…the conditions required for the „neutrality‟ of money… are, I suspect, precisely the same as those which 
will insure that crises do not occur.”(Keynes 1933, 410-11) 
14 Skidelsky for example, maintains: “Keynes‟ view that uncertainty about the future is the root cause of 
financial crisis may be contrasted with today‟s conventional view that the recent banking collapse was caused 
by the „mispricing of risk‟. ” (Skidelsky 2011, p. 3)   16 
“…the data suggest that despite a deepening of  financial markets, banks may not be any 
safer than in the past. Moreover, the risk they now bear is a small (though  perhaps the most 
volatile) tip of an iceberg of risk they have created” (Rajan 2006, p. 502) 
 
 
What stands outs from Rajan‟s analysis is his claim that the banks created an „iceberg 
of risk‟. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the mainstream theory of finance 
which considers risk as a given element that can be allocated, divided and distributed but 
not created by the banks.  If we consider the mainstream theory of financial intermediaries 
and the example of Stiglitz and Weiss, we note that the risk is that of assigning saved corn 
to an inefficient farmer or a conman and that the presence of banks, capable of evaluating 
the  characteristics  of  the  farmer  and  the  plots  of  land,  attenuating  the  effects  of  the 
presence of asymmetric information, reduces the dimension of risk. Rajan‟s claim that it is 
finance that creates the risk can be justified by considering the relation between money and 
uncertainty that can be defined by following Keynes‟s theory.   
This causal relation can be illustrated by considering a world in which a particular 
money as bank money is used. This is a point common to Keynes and  Schumpeter; they 
both distinguish between two types of economies. The first one is an economic system, 
which Keynes defined as a real exchange economy and Schumpeter as a pure exchange 
economy, in which money is neutral. The second one, which Keynes defines as a monetary 
economy and Schumpeter as a capitalist economy, is an economic system in which the 
presence of bank money radically changes the structure of the economic system compared 
with a real exchange economy. It is not simply the presence of money that characterises a 
monetary  economy  but  the  presence  of  money  that  has  particular  characteristics  that 
Keynes and Schumpeter identify in bank money. They both underline that the spread of  
bank money  eliminates the distinction between  money and credit;  in a world in which 
bank liabilities are used as a means of payment, money is created by means of a credit 
contract. The process of money creation cannot be separated from the process of credit 
creation, and the supply of credit becomes independent of the saving decisions. All this has 
a big impact on the structure of the economic system.
15   
                                                 
15 On this point there is a substantive difference between Keynes and Schumpeter on the one hand, and 
Wicksell on the other. Wicksell, before Keynes and Schumpeter, claims that in an economy in which bank 
money is used the distinction between the process of money creation and credit creation disappears, but 
despite this he denies that the  spread of bank money changes the structure of the economic system compared 
to the one that characterises a world in which capital goods are exchanged without the use of money. His 
thesis is based on the distinction between the natural rate of interest and the monetary rate of interest; both   17 
The first structural element that characterises a monetary economy and whose presence 
can be explained by the spread of bank money is uncertainty. The causal sequence that 
links bank money and uncertainty and thus permits us to consider the financial system as a 
creator of uncertainty, in line with Rajan‟s  affirmation, can be defined by considering two 
relations: the first is the relation between investment decisions  and uncertainty; the second 
is the relation between money and investment decisions. These relations  are dealt with in 
the next two sections.   
 
3.1.1 Investments, innovation  and uncertainty 
The  relation between investment decisions and uncertainty can be explained by recalling 
that Keynes  (1937a) claims  that the classical  theory   is  able to  describe only a world 
without  uncertainty,  that  is  an  economy  in  which  consumption  decisions  prevail  and 
decisions on investment and wealth accumulation, whose results are not predictable in 
probabilistic terms, are absent.
16 Naturally it would be excessive to claim that the classical 
theory describes an economic system based only on consumption decisions; instead, what 
divides  the  classical  theory  from  the  keynesian  theory  is  the  specification  of  the 
characteristics of investment decisions.  The classical theory considers investments as a 
phenomenon that depends on saving decisions and is independent of the presence of bank 
money.  What  distinguishes  the  investments  that  characterise  the  monetary  economy 
described by Keynes is the fact that they are closely associated with the dimension of 
uncertainty. Of course even in the case of an economy that produces just one good, we can 
assume that an entrepreneur is not able to predict in probabilistic terms the future results of 
his decisions. This situation arises due to extra-economic factors such as unfavourable 
climatic conditions that ruin the harvest, or social-political events such as the break-out of 
a  war,  and  so  forth.  What  distinguishes  the  investments  that  are  made  in  a  monetary 
                                                                                                                                                          
Keynes and Schumpeter abandon the concept of the natural rate of interest and stress the monetary nature of 
the interest rate. 
16  “The  whole  object  of  the  accumulation  of  wealth  is  to  produce  results,  or  potential  results,  at  a 
comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the  fact that our knowledge of the 
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of 
the classical economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were 
necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable 
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed 
future is an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth accumulation the 
more essential does such amendment become.” Keynes (1937a, p. 113). 
   18 
economy is the fact that the impossibility of predicting their results in probabilistic terms is 
due to factors of an economic nature, that is the factors which make the distinction between 
the production phase and the sale phase relevant. This conclusion can be understood if we 
consider the examples of investment decisions used by Keynes: 
 
“Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some year 
hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that 
our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a 
textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of 
London, amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence.” (Keynes 1936, 
149-50) 
 
The  future  yield  of  a  railway,  a  copper  mine  or  an  Atlantic  liner  are  not  easily 
foreseeable  because they do not coincide with the productivity of some specific productive 
factor such as land in the case of the Smith‟s corn economy, or the boat in the case of 
Böhm-Bawerk‟s  fishermen’s economy. The investments considered by Keynes have the 
same characteristics as the innovations that are  at the centre of Schumpeter‟s analysis. As 
is well known, Schumpeter (1912) holds that innovations constitute the first endogenous 
factor that brings about the process of change characterising a capitalist economy. The 
phenomenon of innovation regards the sphere of production and it may consist  of the 
realization of a new product, the introduction of a new productive method or the opening 
of new markets.  
We can consider the investments of the keynesian entrepreneur as the tool that  firms 
use  in  order  to  launch new  products  on  the  market,  or  modify  the  productive  process 
through which the existing goods are realized, or even open new markets; so the keynesian 
entrepreneur  who  takes  the  investment  decisions  coincides  with  the  schumpeterian 
entrepreneur  who  introduces  innovations.  This  economy  cannot  be  described  using  a 
theoretical model that assumes that a single good is produced since the entrepreneurs, with 
their investment decisions, introduce innovations which create new goods are introduced.  
This characteristic gives prominence to the uncertainty dimension. In an economy in 
which just one good is produced, such as a corn economy whose investments are made up 
of unconsumed corn, entrepreneurs are sure of selling everything they produce because the 
good produced is what ensures the survival of consumers. This does not hold when we 
consider innovations that give rise to the production of new goods: the entrepreneur who 
produces the new good is not at all sure that he will be able to sell, making a satisfactory 
profit, all of the production because the innovation alters the existing world, making it very   19 
difficult to predict the reaction of the consumers to the new proposal (Schumpeter 1912, 
65).  
For  this  reason,  both  Keynes  and  Schumpeter  note  that  investment  decisions  and  
innovations are carried out by agents who have particular skills, that is by agents who are 
able to take decisions in conditions of uncertainty, guided by what Keynes defined as 
animal spirits: 
 
“… a large proportion  of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather 
than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, 
of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out 
over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous 
urge  to  action  rather  than  inaction,  and  not  as  the  outcome  of  a  weighted  average  of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. Enterprise only pretends to itself 
to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. 
Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of 
benefits to come. Thus if the animals spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, 
leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and 
die…” (Keynes 1936, 161-2)
17    
 
In  a  world  in  which  several  goods  are  produced,  the  investments  that  lead  to  the 
production of new goods are made in conditions of uncertainty as the entrepreneur is not 
able to know, for example, how many cars he will be able to sell and at what price.   
 
3.1.2 Bank money and investment decisions 
The second link of the causal sequence between money and uncertainty is constituted by 
the relation between bank money and investments. To explain this relation  we can observe 
that both the keynesian entrepreneur and the schumpeterian innovator-entrepreneur must 
have the resources available to them to carry out their investments; bank money is the tool 
that  enables  them  to  obtain  these  resources.  The  importance  of  bank  money  can  be 
explained by recalling that the investments that characterise a monetary economy are very 
different  from  those  that  are  found,  for  example,  in  Smith‟s  corn  economy.  In  a  corn 
economy to invest means to decide not to consume a part of the corn crop in order to 
produce more corn, while in a monetary economy to invest means, for example, to decide 
to build a railway; building a railway would be very difficult without bank money.   
Indeed,  let  us  suppose  that  in  our  corn  economy  an  entrepreneur  emerges  who, 
following his animal spirits, plans to build a railway the construction of which requires the 
                                                 
17 Some years earlier Schumpeter (1912) noted that the introduction of innovations required very different   
capabilities  from  those  needed  to  run  existing  firms  and  he  describes  the  decisions  of  the  innovating 
entrepreneur using similar terms to those used by Keynes  (see: Bertocco 2007).   20 
employment of a certain number of workers for ten years. Let us further suppose that the 
existing production techniques make it possible to produce a quantity of corn sufficient to 
guarantee  the  survival  of  the  farm  workers  and  those  that  might  be  employed  in  the 
construction of the railway. We can observe that the railway, at least theoretically, could be 
built also in a corn economy; in this case the construction of the railway is financed by the 
corn  producers  who  give  to  our  entrepreneur  the  corn  necessary  to  pay  the  workers 
involved in building the railway. In return, they receive debt claims that will give them, 
when the railway is built, the right to obtain a quantity of corn equal to the amount lent 
during construction plus a premium consisting of the interest. 
There is at least one fundamental element that impede the realisation of this credit 
contract. It is the fact that it is very difficult for corn producers to assess whether the 
entrepreneur who plans to construct the railway will be able to return the loaned capital 
because the credit contract necessary to finance the construction of the railway is very 
different from the one, that is usually made in a corn economy, under which the corn 
producer gives the excess corn over the amount he intends to consume to another producer 
who will use it to produce corn. In this case, given the production technique, it is easy for 
the creditor to calculate the yield of the loaned corn and thus to define the rate of interest to 
apply  to  the  debtor;  in  the  case  of  the  railway  this  evaluation  is  much  more  difficult 
because there is no physical law that makes it possible to calculate how much corn will be 
obtained by the sale of train tickets starting from the amount of corn used to build the 
railway.  
The construction of the railway becomes easier in a world in which bank money is 
used.  In this case our entrepreneur will have to convince the banks, not the corn producers, 
of the profitability of his project. The banks will finance the construction of the railway by 
creating new money with which our entrepreneur will pay the workers who will then be 
able to buy corn. The corn producers will not have any difficulty in exchanging corn  for 
bank money, which is a perfectly liquid debt claim that can be used as a means of payment 
at any time. Although they do sell corn to the workers involved in building the railway, the 
corn producers are not creditors of our entrepreneur who is instead in debt to the bank, 
which is in turn in debt to those who own bank money. These agents may be the corn 
producers if we assume that the latter decide to accumulate the money obtained by selling 
the corn, or other agents that decided to accumulate the money obtained from payment of 
goods or services.     21 
Banks  therefore  carry  out  a  key  role  in  a  monetary  economy:  they  evaluate  the 
applications  for  financing  presented  by  entrepreneurs.  The  banks  share  with  the 
entrepreneurs the responsibility of deciding which investments are carried out; with their 
decisions they influence the development of the economic system; it is a very different role 
from that of mere intermediary that they could perform in a corn economy by facilitating 
the transfer of corn saved to the producers who intend to expand their grain production. 
Thus, we can maintain that the presence of  bank money, and a well-developed credit 
market, constitutes the necessary condition for the development of an economy in which 
investment decisions become  relevant and in which the presence of uncertainty becomes 
an essential factor. It is an economic system in which banks create uncertainty through the 
production of money and credit, since, by financing  the construction of railways, they 
induce the economic system to take on a risk, which cannot be calculated in probabilistic 
terms, about the success of the railway; we can state that  uncertainty is not merely an 
exogenous dimension, but it becomes a factor whose  presence is explained by the spread 
of bank money. 
 
3.2 Bank money and speculation 
The phenomenon of speculation  is the second element that must be explained by a theory 
of  finance  capable  of  elaborating  a  meaningful  analysis  of  the  origin  of  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis. To explain the phenomenon of speculation it  is necessary to justify the 
presence of what V. Smith defines as asset markets, that is markets dealing in financial 
assets that after purchase do not  disappear from the market but can be continuously  traded 
in the future.  To explain the presence of these markets it is necessary, as we have already 
noted, to define the concept of wealth. It can be shown that the presence of a bank money 
and the elements that characterise the relation between bank money and uncertainty that 
we have illustrated in the previous section, allow us to define the concept of wealth and 
thus of speculation.  
We have already noted that it is unrealistic  to associate  the concept of wealth with an 
economic system that can be compared to Smith‟s corn economy in which a single good is 
produced. This does not apply in the case of the monetary economy described by Keynes in 
which the existence of bank money radically changes the concepts of  credit  and saving. In 
a corn economy decisions of the producer-saver are at the origin of the causal sequence 
that determines the supply of credit and the  investment decisions, but in a world in which 
bank money is used this causal sequence is no longer valid. In this case the corn  producer,   22 
for example, produces corn to meet the demand of the workers involved in the construction 
of the railway who purchase the corn in exchange for the  money created by the banks to 
finance the innovator-entrepreneur who decided to build the  railway.  
The corn producer does not become a saver at the moment when he decides to produce 
grain and to consume just a part of it, but at the moment in which he sells the corn for 
money and decides to accumulate money. The corn producer becomes a saver not because 
he is the creditor of a specific agent to whom he lent corn, but because he decides to 
accumulate purchasing power, obtained by selling corn, that can be used at any future 
moment to purchase goods.  Money transforms savers into wealth owners; this point is 
highlighted by Keynes when he states that: “… the act of saving implies… a desire for 
„wealth‟  as  such,  that  is  for  a  potentiality  of  consuming  an  unspecified  article  at  an 
unspecified time.” (Keynes 1936, p. 211). 
Of  course  the  presence  of  savers-wealth  owners  cannot  be  explained  within  an 
economic system in which a  single good is produced, rather it characterises a system in 
which multiple goods are produced that can be classified in two categories: the goods 
necessary to satisfy what Keynes describes as the absolute needs, and the goods that are 
required  to  meet  the  relative  needs.
18  In this economic system any carpenter or corn 
producer who would not be willing to accumulate wealth in the form of tables or corn, will 
instead be  willing to accumulate wealth in the form of money.    
Having defined the concept of wealth and consideri ng the elements of the relation 
between bank money and uncertainty described in the previous section, it is possible to 
explain the presence of markets in which financial assets such as  long term bonds and 
stock  are  traded.  The  presence  of  these  markets  al lows  wealth  owners  to  become 
speculators; once the savers-wealth owners decide how to use their disposable income by 
                                                 
18 “Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be insatiable. But they fall into two classes –
those needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human 
beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us  
above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows. Needs of the second class, those which satisfy the desire for 
superiority, may indeed  be insatiable; for the higher the general level, the higher still are they. But this is not 
so true of the absolute need –a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are all of us were 
of, when these needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic 
purposes.” (Keynes 1931,  CW vol. IX, p. 326)   23 
choosing between consumption and saving, they will have to define the  composition of 
their wealth by choosing money or alternative financial instruments.
19   
Keynes considers at least two alternative assets to money: long term bonds and shares. 
The presence of  long term bonds  can be associated with the realisation of long term 
investments such as, for example, railways, and/or the presence of  a public sector that 
produces services that represent a significant amount of GDP.
20  Keynes uses the presence 
of long term bonds to explain an important aspect of the phenomenon of speculation, i.e. 
speculative demand for money; wealth owners become speculators in that they choose the 
composition of their wealth depending on their forecasts, formulated in conditions of 
uncertainty, about prospective gains to be made from bonds  which depends on the future 
value of the rate of interest.
21 
The second type of asset that can be accumulated by savers as an alternative to money 
is shares. Keynes (1936, chapter 12) notes that the spread of shares characterises a phase in 
the development of the modern economy in which the ownership of the firm is divided up 
among many owners who do not directly manage the firm; this evolution can be  explained 
by thinking of the realisation of innovations that require  large investments as in the case of 
railways.  In  this  phase  markets  develop  in  which  shares  and  long  term  bonds  are 
continuously  traded  and  the  figure  of  the  speculator  emerges  alongside  that  of  the 
entrepreneur. Keynes  distinguishes between speculation  and enterprise  by proposing to 
use: “… the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market, 
                                                 
19 “The psychological time-preferences of an individual require two distinct sets of decisions… The first… 
determines for each individual how much of his income he will consume and how much he will reserve in 
some form of command over future consumption. But this decision having been made, there is a further 
decision which awaits him, namely in what form he will hold the command over future consumption which 
he have reserved… Does he want to hold it in the form of immediate, liquid command (i.e. money or its 
equivalent)? Or is he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or indefinite period, leaving it 
to future market conditions to determine in what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred command over 
specific goods into immediate command over goods in general?” (Keynes 1936, p.166) 
20 “The entrepreneur when he decides to invest has to be satisfied on two points: firstly, that he can obtain 
sufficient  short-term  finance  during  the  period  of  producing  the  investment;  and  secondly,  that  he  can 
eventually fund his short term obligations by a long-term issue on satisfactory conditions.” (Keynes 1937b, p. 
217) 
21 “There is …a necessary condition failing which the existence of a liquidity-preference for money as a 
means of holding wealth could not exist. This necessary condition is the existence of uncertainty as to the 
future of the rate of interest, i.e. as to the complex of rates of interest for varying maturities which will rule at 
future dates.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 168)   24 
and the term enterprise for the activity of forecasting the perspective yield of assets over 
their whole life…” (Keynes 1936, 158). The element that the activity of the speculator and 
the  entrepreneur  share  is  the  fact  that  they  both  rely  on  expectations  even  if  these 
expectations happen to be different. The entrepreneur takes his decisions on the basis of 
expectations  about  the  future  profits  of  investments  „over  their  whole  life‟  while  the 
speculator must predict „the psychology of the market‟. 
Keynes distinguishes two categories of speculators: professional speculators who take  
their decisions by gathering information on the financial situation of the various firms, 
making evaluations about their future value. These decisions are taken on the basis of the 
so-called fundamentals. The second category is made up of  „ignorant individuals‟ that is, 
those who purchase and sell firms‟ stock without having professional knowledge of the 
firm or the economic system (Keynes 1936, 154). Keynes further notes that in the financial 
markets, although it may not seem logical, the effects of the choices of the professional 
speculators  do  not  necessarily  prevail  over  those  of  the  second    group  of  speculators 
(Keynes 1936,  154). And  this influences the behaviour of the  professional speculators for 
whom it is more profitable to try to predict how the market will evaluate bonds and stock 
rather than elaborate forecasts based on their professional competencies (Keynes 1936, 
155).  
Finally, Keynes wonders  how speculation can influence  investment decisions such as 
the  construction  of  a  railway,  an  ocean  liner,  a  new  drug,  on  which  society‟s  welfare 
depends.  He  notes  that  the  presence  of  very  liquid  financial  markets  and  an  intense 
speculative activity can impede the realisation of these investments since the speculation 
may  offer    easier  opportunities  for  gains.
22    Keynes  believes  that  speculation  can 
compromise the entrepreneurial spirit: 
 
“Speculators    may  do  no  harm  as  bubbles  on  a  steady  stream  of  enterprise. But  the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When 
the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job 
is  likely  to  be  ill-done.  The  measure  of  success  attained  by  Wall  Street,  regarded  as  an 
                                                 
22 “Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He 
who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious days and run greater risks than he who tries to guess 
better than the crowd hoe the crowd will behave; and, given equal intelligence, he may make more disastrous 
mistakes. … It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of time and our ignorance of the future than to 
beat the gun. Moreover, life is not long enough; -human nature desire quick results, there is a peculiar zest in 
making money quickly, and remoter gains are discounted by the average man at a very high rate.” (Keynes 
1936, p. 157) Recently many economists have underlined this concept; see for example: Tobin 1984, Dore 
2009, Stiglitz 2010.   25 
institution  of  which the  proper  social  purpose  is  to  direct  new  investment  into  the    most 
profitable  channels in terms  of  future  yield, cannot  be  claimed  as  one  of the  outstanding 
triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism -which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the 
best brains of Wall Street have been directed towards a different object.” (Keynes 1936, p. 
159)
23  
   
These considerations allow us to underline the weakness of the mainstream theory that 
assumes the presence  of asset markets and speculative bubbles in a world in which one 
good is produced, and in which the role of the financial system is to intermediate funds 
from savers to entrepreneurs.  
 
3.3 The explanation of the crisis 
What we learn from Keynes e Schumpeter allows us to formulate a theory of finance that is 
alternative to the mainstream one. Both highlight that, in contrast to what the mainstream  
theory holds, the spread of bank money radically changes the structure of the economic 
system. In the first place, the nature of credit changes since it eliminates the causal relation 
between saving and credit supply. Second, the use of a bank money allows us to state that 
finance creates  uncertainty. Third, the presence of a bank money makes it possible to 
underline the link between saving and wealth accumulation and to define the concepts of 
wealth and speculation.   
These  features  which  characterise  Keynes‟s  monetary  economy  and  Schumpeter‟s 
capitalist economy have two important consequences. First, they lead us to recognise that 
there is no ideal world without imperfections in which the financial system is made only of 
savers who directly finance firms, and towards which concrete economic systems converge 
thanks to the action of financial intermediaries such as banks, whose function is to annul 
the effects of the imperfections that characterise the real economy.   
Second, these characteristics make it possible to highlight the fragility of an economy 
characterised  by the presence of a developed financial system, that is to emphasise the fact 
that the monetary economy is prone to crises. Minsky (1975, 1980,1982) who had been a 
student  of  Schumpeter,  and  on  several  occasions  had  recommended  combining  the 
                                                 
23 The prevalence of speculation over enterprise would have high social costs: “The social object of skilled 
investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, 
private object of the most skilled investment to-day is „to beat the gun‟, as the Americans so well express it, 
to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow.”   (Keynes 1936, p. 
155)   26 
approaches of Keynes and Schumpeter
24 is the contemporary  economist who described the 
financial nature of the instability of a  monetary  economy. It is easy to understand the 
reasons for this instability if we bear in mind that the money is created by means of a credit 
contract that provides that the debtor must repay the amount received at a set future date. It 
is a different credit contract from the one that characterises Smith‟s corn economy; in that 
case, the farmers who produced more grain than they required for their own consumption 
needs and their investment capacity, loan the corn to other farmers who are willing to 
invest  it to produce more corn in  the future. The  higher production of corn obtained 
through  the  investment  will  allow  the  debtor  to  reimburse  the  loan  obtained;  a  corn 
economy is not a fragile economy even in the presence of a high level of dissociation 
between saving and investment. 
Instead, in the case of a monetary economy the credit contract by means of which 
money is created is used to finance investments with which innovations are realised; the 
financing  of  innovations  makes  the  system  fragile  because  it  occurs  in  conditions  of 
uncertainty. The entrepreneur who took out a loan to build a railway will be able to repay 
the loan only if he is able to sell a sufficient quantity of train tickets. Unlike what happens 
in the case of corn, in which the proceeds are determined by the productivity of the corn 
used as a means of production, there is no objective criteria for predicting the monetary 
proceeds that will be produced  by the railway.  
The  fragility  of  a  monetary  economy  does  not  only  derive  from  the  financing  of 
innovations but also from speculation. Indeed, the credit contract through which money is 
created  can  serve  to  finance  the  speculative  demand  for  assets;  also  this  operation  is 
performed in conditions of uncertainty and therefore the stability of the system increases. 
The subprime crisis can be seen as  an important example which confirm Keynes‟s thesis 
that a  monetary economy  is  very fragile:  “...when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation...” (Keynes 1936, p. 159) 
 The financial crisis generated by the subprime mortgages can therefore be explained 
by taking into account the elements that characterise a monetary economy: i)  the process 
of money creation managed by the banking system that makes it possible to explain the 
expansion in the supply of mortgages; ii) the creation of uncertainty on the part of the 
                                                 
24  As  well  as  Minsky  (1986,  1993)  other  authors  have  emphasised  the  desirability  of  integrating  the 
Keynesian  theory  of  income  determination  with  Schumpeter‟s  theory  of  economic  development;  see  for 
example: Morishima (1992); Goodwin (1993); Vercelli (1997); Bertocco (2007).  
   27 
financial  system  by  means  of  the  expansion  of  the  supply  and  demand  of  subprime 
mortgages determined by the widespread conviction that: „this time is different‟; iii) the 




The supporters of the mainstream theory state that the economic crisis  triggered by the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market should not induce economists to abandon the 
dominant theory, as happened in the case of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the 
stagflation of the 1970s.  
The first result presented in this paper is to show that the mainstream theory of finance 
does not constitute an instrument capable of explaining the origin of the crisis. The reasons 
that justify this conclusion were identified by analysing the explanation of the origin of the 
subprime mortgage crisis elaborated by the supporters of the mainstream theory; it has 
been shown that this explanation is based on two elements which are not coherent with the 
traditional theory of finance: i) a concept of risk which is different from the one on  which 
the mainstream theory of financial intermediaries is based; ii) the concepts of speculation 
and speculative bubble which are not covered by the economic system described by the 
mainstream theory. This implies that an explanation coherent with the origin of the crisis 
of the subprime  mortgages  must be based on a theory of finance  which is  capable of 
including these two elements. 
The second result of this paper is to present a theory of finance that makes it possible 
to explain these two elements. It is a theory based on the keynesian concepts of uncertainty 
and speculation. Unlike the many works that, after the crisis arose, maintain the need to 
recuperate Keynes, in this paper uncertainty has not been considered simply as a fact that 
characterises the keynesian economic system and is overlooked instead by the mainstream  
theory. But, starting with the Keynesian concepts of monetary theory of production and 
monetary economy, it has been shown that the importance of the dimension of uncertainty 
derives  from  the  existence  of  a  money  such  as  bank  money.  In  a  monetary  economy, 
finance,  which  can  be  identified  with  the  process  of  money  creation  through  a  credit 
contract, not only creates uncertainty but it determines the conditions for the  concepts of 
wealth and speculation to come to the fore. This relation between money,  uncertainty  and 
speculation  was illustrated by highlighting the complementary nature of  the theories of 
Keynes and Schumpeter. Finally, referring to Minsky‟s theory, it is concluded that the   28 
causal sequence that links money to uncertainty and speculation allows us to explain the 
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